Syllabus

NOTE:  Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES RING v. ARIZONA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

No. 01�488. Argued April 22, 2002�Decided June 24, 2002

At petitioner Ring�s Arizona trial for murder and related offenses, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing. 

The judge at that stage must determine the existence or nonexistence of statutorily enumerated �aggravating circumstances� and any �mitigating circumstances.� The death sentence may be imposed only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

 Following such a hearing, Ring�s trial judge sentenced him to death. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was, inter alia, the victim�s actual killer. 

See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them, that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring�s minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency. 

        On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona�s capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment�s jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of a fact raising the defendant�s maximum penalty. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. The State responded that this Court had upheld Arizona�s system in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, and had stated in Apprendi that Walton remained good law. 

The Arizona Supreme Court observed that Apprendi and Jones cast doubt on Walton�s continued viability and found that the Apprendi majority�s interpretation of Arizona law, 530 U.S., at 496�497, was wanting. Justice O�Connor�s Apprendi dissent, id., at 538, the Arizona court noted, correctly described how capital sentencing works in that State: A defendant cannot receive a death sentence unless the judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists.

 Nevertheless, recognizing that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply Walton, a decision this Court had not overruled, the Arizona court rejected Ring�s constitutional attack. It then upheld the trial court�s finding on the pecuniary gain aggravating factor, reweighed that factor against Ring�s lack of a serious criminal record, and affirmed the death sentence. 

Held: Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; this Court�s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, Walton is overruled to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U.S., at 647�649. Because Arizona�s enumerated aggravating factors operate as �the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,� Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Pp. 10�23. 

    (a) In upholding Arizona�s capital sentencing scheme against a charge that it violated the Sixth Amendment, the Walton Court ruled that aggravating factors were not �elements of the offense�; they were �sentencing considerations� guiding the choice between life and death. 497 U.S., at 648. 

Walton drew support from Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, in which the Court held there was no constitutional bar to an appellate court�s finding that a defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, as Enmund, supra, required for imposition of the death penalty in felony-murder cases. If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding be proved as an element of the capital murder offense or that a jury make that finding, Walton stated, it could not be concluded that a State must denominate aggravating circumstances �elements� of the offense or commit to a jury only, and not to a judge, determination of the existence of such circumstances. 497 U.S., at 649. Subsequently, the Court suggested in Jones that any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury, 526 U.S., at 243, n. 6, and distinguished Walton as having characterized the finding of aggravating facts in the context of capital sentencing as a choice between a greater and a lesser penalty, not as a process of raising the sentencing range�s ceiling, 526 U.S., at 251. Pp. 10�15. 

    (b) In Apprendi, the sentencing judge�s finding that racial animus motivated the petitioner�s weapons offense triggered application of a state �hate crime enhancement� that doubled the maximum authorized sentence. This Court held that the sentence enhancement violated Apprendi�s right to a jury determination whether he was guilty of every element of the crime with which he was charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S., at 477. 

That right attached not only to Apprendi�s weapons offense but also to the �hate crime� aggravating circumstance. Id., at 476. The dispositive question, the Court said, is one not of form, but of effect. Id., at 494. If a State makes an increase in a defendant�s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact�no matter how the State labels it�must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 482�483.

 A defendant may not be exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Id., at 483. Walton could be reconciled with Apprendi, the Court asserted: The key distinction was that an Arizona first-degree murder conviction carried a maximum sentence of death; once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries death as its maximum penalty, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed. 530 U.S., at 497.

 In dissent in Apprendi, Justice O�Connor described as �demonstrably untrue� the majority�s assertion that the jury makes all the findings necessary to expose the defendant to a death sentence. Such a defendant, she emphasized, cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the critical factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Id., at 538. Walton, Justice O�Connor�s dissent insisted, if followed, would have required the Court to uphold Apprendi�s sentence. Id., at 537. Pp. 15�17. 

    (c) Given the Arizona Supreme Court�s finding that the Apprendi dissent�s portrayal of Arizona�s capital sentencing law was precisely right, and recognizing that the Arizona court�s construction of the State�s own law is authoritative, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, this Court is persuaded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot survive Apprendi�s reasoning. 

In an effort to reconcile its capital sentencing system with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, Arizona first restates the Apprendi majority�s ruling that, because Arizona law specifies death or life imprisonment as the only sentencing options for the first-degree murder of which Ring was convicted, he was sentenced within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict. This argument overlooks Apprendi�s instruction that the relevant inquiry is one of effect, not form. 530 U.S., at 494. In effect, the required finding of an aggravated circumstance exposed Ring to a greater punishment than that authorized by the guilty verdict. Ibid. The Arizona first-degree murder statute authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense, id., at 541 (O�Connor, J., dissenting), for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. If Arizona prevailed on its opening argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a �meaningless and formalistic� rule of statutory drafting. See id., at 541. Arizona�s argument based on the Walton distinction between an offense�s elements and sentencing factors is rendered untenable by Apprendi�s repeated instruction that the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an element or a sentencing factor is not determinative of the question �who decides,� judge or jury. See, e.g., 530 U.S., at 492. Arizona further urges that aggravating circumstances necessary to trigger a death sentence may nonetheless be reserved for judicial determination because death is different: States have constructed elaborate sentencing procedures in death cases because of constraints this Court has said the Eighth Amendment places on capital sentencing, see, e.g., id., at 522�523 (Thomas, J., concurring). Apart from the Eighth Amendment provenance of aggravating factors, however, Arizona presents no specific reason for excepting capital defendants from the constitutional protections extended to defendants generally, and none is readily apparent. Id., at 539 (O�Connor, J., dissenting).

 In various settings, the Court has interpreted the Constitution to require the addition of an element or elements to the definition of a crime in order to narrow its scope. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561�562. If a legislature responded to such a decision by adding the element the Court held constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment guarantee would apply to that element. 

There is no reason to differentiate capital crimes from all others in this regard. Arizona�s suggestion that judicial authority over the finding of aggravating factors may be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty is unpersuasive. The Sixth Amendment jury trial right does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). In any event, the superiority of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident, given that the great majority of States responded to this Court�s Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury.

 Although stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law, this Court has overruled prior decisions where, as here, the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172. Pp. 17�23.

200 Ariz. 267, 25 P.3d 1139, reversed and remanded.

    Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. O�Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined.

 WASHINGTON, 24 GIU 2002 - La Corte Suprema ha stabilito oggi che e' incostituzionale per un giudice decidere al posto della giuria la condanna a morte di un imputato.

La sentenza e' molto importante perche' oltre 150 condanne a morte in almeno cinque stati Usa dovranno adesso essere riesaminate. 

In Arizona e altri quatttro stati, mentre e' la giuria a decidere sulla colpevolezza o meno di un imputato, spetta al giudice decidere se esistono circostanze aggravanti in grado di far scattare la pena di morte.   Secondo la Corte Suprema (che ha votato sette contro due), la Costituzione non concede questo potere ai giudici perche' la decisione finale deve essere presa dalle giurie.

   Il caso che ha provocato la decisione della Corte Suprema era di natura piu' limitata: una legge dell'Arizona che concede ai giudici il potere di aumentare di due anni le condanne se vi sono cause di odio razziale o di altro tipo. La maggioranza dei giudici della Corte Suprema ha concluso che questa legge e' incostituzionale e che lo stesso principio deve essere applicato a maggior ragione alla autonomia dei giudici in fatto di condanna a morte. 

25/6/2002 

FINO AD ORA ERANO I GIUDICI. EFFETTO RETROATTIVO: 150 AVRANNO SALVA LA VITA 

Terremoto nella pena di morte 

La Corte Suprema Usa: a decidere sar� la giuria 

corrispondente da NEW YORK

Per la seconda volta in meno di sette giorni la Corte Suprema degli Stati Uniti si pronuncia contro alcune regole che governano l�istituto della pena capitale. Una settimana fa aveva stabilito con sei voti contro tre l�esenzione dei ritardati mentali dalle condanne a morte, ieri con sette voti contro due � andata oltre ed ha deciso che d�ora in poi dovranno essere le giurie e non pi� i giudici a decidere se un condannato dovr� essere giustiziato o meno.

 La sentenza, scritta dal giudice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, riguarda il caso di un omicidio commesso in Arizona durante una rapina avvenuta 1994 e, rovesciando un precedente pronunciamento della Corte Suprema, stabilisce che una condanna alla pena capitale decisa dal giudice �viola il Sesto Emendamento della Costituzione� che garantisce il �diritto ad essere processato da una giuria� ad ogni cittadino degli Stati Uniti. L�applicazione della sentenza ha effetto immediato nei cinque Stati degli Usa - Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Colorado e Nebraska - dove finora la giuria stabiliva solamente colpevolezza o innocenza di un imputato al termine del dibattimento mentre poi toccava al giudice intervenire comminando la pena capitale in base ad una valutazione sul �carattere odioso� del crimine commesso ed eventuali motivazioni pecuniarie.

 La Corte Suprema di Washington ha deciso che la sua decisione ha effetto retroattivo e dunque rimette in discussione le condanne a morte decretate nei confronti di oltre centocinquanta condannati nei cinque Stati. Non � al momento ancora chiaro cosa avverr� di questi detenuti nel braccio della morte di diversi penitenziari federali, ma le possibilit� sono tre: tramutare la pena capitale in ergastolo, rifare il processo o decidere, come avvenne nel 1972, una sospensione delle esecuzioni. 

A differenza di quanto avvenuto in occasione della decisione sull�esenzione dei minorati ieri la sentenza � stata approvata con il voto favorevole non solo dei giudici di orientamento liberal, ma anche di due noti conservatori come Scalia e Thomas. L�impatto del passo compiuto potrebbe andare anche oltre i centocinquanta condannati a morte che vengono di fatto graziati, perch� in altri quattro Stati - Florida, Indiana, Delaware ed Alabama - vige al momento la prassi di una decisione in due tempi presa da giuria e giudice che potrebbe adesso essere rimessa in discussione. Sebbene la sentenza del giudice Bader Ginsburg non intenda in alcuna maniera contestare l�istituto della pena capitale i due giudici che hanno votato contro - compreso il presidente della Corte Suprema Rehnquist - hanno denunciato il rischio che �venga adesso ad essere incrinato l�intero sistema nazionale della giustizia criminale�. 

Negli Stati Uniti vi sono al momento 3700 persone in attesa di essere giustiziate nei 38 Stati dove ancora vige la pena capitale, ma i due pronunciamenti della Corte Suprema confermano l�orientamento della giurisprudenza a stabilire regole molto rigide al fine di limitare quanto pi� possibile il rischio che venga commesso un errore di giudizio. L�impressione negli ambienti vicini alla Corte Suprema � che le due decisioni potrebbero presto essere seguite da altre sentenze. 

Non a caso, sempre ieri, i nove giudici di Washington hanno fatto sapere che durante l�autunno prenderanno in esame il ricorso presentato da un condannato a morte nello Stato del Tennessee - Abu Ali Abdur Rahman - che solleva la questione dell�accesso limitato da parte degli imputati alle prove relative al processo a cui vengono sottoposti. 

Maurizio Molinari

Seconda sentenza della Corte Suprema americana in quattro giorni

Un nuovo passo contro la pena di morte

DAL NOSTRO CORRISPONDENTE

NEW YORK - Per la seconda volta in meno di una settimana la Corte Suprema degli Stati Uniti si � espressa sulla pena di morte, con un'altra cruciale sentenza destinata ad influenzare il futuro di una delle pi� controverse istituzioni del sistema giudiziario americano.

Con 7 voti contro 2, il massimo tribunale degli Stati Uniti ha ieri decretato che spetta alla giuria popolare e non ai giudici avere l'ultima parola in una condanna capitale. La decisione, retroattiva, rimette in forse la sorte di quasi 800 condannati in nove Stati (oltre un quinto dei circa 3700 detenuti nei bracci della morte in America) ed � stata subito applaudita dagli abolizionisti.

�La Corte Suprema ha espresso serie riserve su come la pena di morte viene applicata - afferma Richard C. Dieter, direttore esecutivo della Death Penalty Information Center di Washington -. La sentenza odierna dimostra quanto sia diventato urgente rivedere l'intero processo delle esecuzioni capitali, che nel frattempo andrebbero subito fermate�. Si tratta della seconda decisione sulla pena capitale in chiave decisamente liberal , fatta dal supremo tribunale Usa nel giro di 4 giorni. Gioved� scorso la stessa Corte aveva sancito il divieto di giustiziare i ritardati mentali condannati per omicidio, in quanto �pena crudele e inusitata�. Gli alti magistrati hanno di fatto reso incostituzionali le leggi esistenti in cinque stati (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana e Nebraska) che assegnano ai giudici dei processi il potere di decidere se l'imputato, condannato dalla giuria in fase di verdetto (�innocente o colpevole�), merita di ricevere la sentenza capitale.

In altri quattro stati - Florida, Alabama, Delaware e Indiana - dopo il verdetto le giurie potevano fino ad oggi emettere delle semplici �raccomandazioni�. Ma l'ultima parola sulla sentenza spettava al giudice del processo o ad una commissione di magistrati, chiamati a valutare eventuali aggravanti.

Ma secondo il giudice donna Ruth Bader Ginsburg, che ha articolato la posizione della maggioranza della Corte, sono le giurie e non i magistrati a dover prendere in considerazione tutti gli elementi, attenuanti ed aggravanti, che possano spedire un imputato al patibolo.

�Il sesto emendamento della Costituzione assicura a tutti gli imputati, inclusi quelli condannati per crimini capitali, il diritto ad essere giudicati da una giuria di pari�, ha detto, giudicando �non convincente� l'argomentazione secondo cui �un giudice � una migliore garanzia contro l'arbitraria imposizione del capestro�.

A spianare la strada alla storica sentenza � stato il caso di Timothy Ring, un rapinatore riconosciuto colpevole di omicidio di primo grado per aver assassinato l'autista di un camioncino blindato nel 1994 in Arizona. Dopo il verdetto di condanna della giuria, il giudice trov� due circostanze aggravanti e decise per la pena di morte.

Contro la maggioranza dei giudici - sempre pi� sensibili ai sondaggi che indicano una sempre minore tolleranza del Paese verso le iniquit� nell�applicazione della pena capitale - si � espresso per la seconda volta il presidente ultra-conservatore della Corte William Rehnquist. Ma con lui questa volta si � schierata Sandra Day O' Connor, l'altra donna della Corte Suprema, che lo scorso 20 giugno aveva votato contro l'esecuzione di ritardati mentali.

 Alessandra Farkas

Court: Judges Can't Impose Death Penalty

Only Jury May Decide to Execute Defendant

By Charles Lane

Tuesday, June 25, 2002; Page A01

The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether a capital defendant gets the death penalty, a decision that could ultimately take more people off death row than any other ruling by the court in three decades.

 By a vote of 7 to 2, the court ruled that Arizona's death-sentencing law violates the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. Under that law, judges alone decide whether the crime included "aggravating" factors, such as extreme brutality, that call for capital punishment. Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska have similar laws and with Arizona have a combined death row population of 168.

 The decision casts serious doubt on laws in four other states -- Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana -- in which the judge decides between life and death after hearing a jury's recommendation. In those states, there are 629 people on death row.

 "This is the first time in 30 years the court has issued a ruling that automatically invalidates a state's overall mechanism for imposing the death penalty," said Michael Mello, a specialist in capital punishment law at Vermont Law School. In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down all state death penalty laws but reauthorized capital punishment through court decisions in 1976.

 Yesterday's ruling in Ring v. Arizona, No. 01-488, was perhaps the most dramatic consequence yet of a landmark 2000 case in which the court roiled the criminal justice system by holding that a jury, not a judge, must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that would increase the jail time a defendant faces for a crime.

 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the court yesterday that in view of that ruling -- known as Apprendi -- the right to a jury trial "would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death."

 The court acknowledged that it was repudiating its 1990 decision upholding Arizona's death penalty law -- the kind of about-face the court tries to avoid lest it undermine confidence in the law. But, Ginsburg wrote, that 12-year-old ruling was no longer viable in light of Apprendi.

 It was the second time in as many weeks that the court had changed its position on a major issue affecting capital punishment. Last week, the court banned executing the mildly mentally retarded, which the court had conditionally approved in 1989.

 As in the mental retardation case, the immediate impact of yesterday's ruling will be more litigation, as death row inmates in the affected states scramble to get their sentences reduced to life imprisonment.

 That was precisely what concerned the two dissenting justices in the case, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor -- who also happen to be the court's two Arizonans. O'Connor was a prosecutor and judge in the state.

 Both opposed Apprendi, and O'Connor's dissenting opinion yesterday, which Rehnquist joined, depicted the new ruling as more proof of Apprendi's "severely destabilizing effect on the criminal justice system."

 Noting that Apprendi has spawned thousands of criminal appeals, "overwhelm[ing]" the courts, including the Supreme Court, O'Connor said the decision "is only going to add to these already serious effects."

 O'Connor predicted, however, that most death row inmates who fight their sentences based on yesterday's ruling will lose.

 But that could depend on how lower courts and, perhaps, the justices themselves decide the highly technical question of whether the ruling creates such a fundamental shift in constitutional rights that prisoners who have exhausted previous appeals should get a chance to take advantage of it.

 "Every murderer on death row [in the five states] will attack his sentence," said Kent Scheidegger, legal director of the Sacramento-based Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, which supports capital punishment. "I would expect that [procedural rules] will bar claims by those who have already finished under direct appeal. But that could be a Supreme Court case all by itself."

 "At a minimum," law professor Mello said, "what the Supreme Court did today is to buy everyone on death row in these five states another 7.5 years of life. That's the average length of time it takes to go from imposition of a death sentence to execution."

The focus shifts to Florida, where there are 383 prisoners on death row, and Alabama, where there are 187 death row inmates.

 In those states, juries make findings about aggravating factors and then recommend a sentence, death or life imprisonment, to the judge. Their recommendation does not have to be unanimous and, in some cases, judges in Alabama and Florida have overridden jury recommendations of life, imposing death instead.

 While the Ring case was pending, the Supreme Court granted stays of execution to two Florida death row inmates and one Alabama death row inmate who are pressing Apprendi-based challenges to the sentencing laws in those states. 

The court is likely to act on those appeals, perhaps by sending them back to the lower courts in light of the new ruling, legal analysts said.

 While the court steered clear of any direct discussion of these states' laws yesterday, even supporters of the death penalty said they could be in jeopardy.

 "Florida and Alabama have a difficult argument to maintain the present system," Scheidegger said.

 The court's ruling yesterday cut across ideological lines, producing a series of separate concurring opinions in which justices candidly explained their own shifting views.

 Justice Antonin Scalia, who supported Apprendi but not the line of cases since 1972 in which the court has tried to regulate state death penalty procedures, admitted that he faced "a difficult choice."

 Scalia joined the majority, he wrote, because the increasing use of judge-determined "sentencing factors" by the states and federal government "cause me to believe that our people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline."

 Possibly looking ahead to a Florida or Alabama case, however, Scalia indicated that he would have no problem if a state leaves "the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge" as long as it required "a prior jury finding of aggravating factor[s]" in the trial or a sentencing hearing. Justice Clarence Thomas joined him in this view.

 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy noted that he opposed Apprendi, but that "it is now the law," and as such cannot be reconciled with Arizona's law.

 Justice Stephen G. Breyer, another Apprendi opponent, said he reached the same conclusions as the justices in the majority -- John Paul Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, David H. Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg -- but for different reasons.

 Citing court opinions, law-review articles and social science reports casting doubt on both the efficacy and fairness of the death penalty, Breyer argued that a death sentence by anyone other than a jury would constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" because it deprives the defendant of important protections against a wrongful sentence.

 Noting that he had voted differently in past cases, Breyer attributed his new view to growing concerns about poor lawyering for capital defendants, convictions of innocent people and racial bias in sentencing. Those concerns, he said, are widely shared by the public and thus best factored into sentencing decisions by representatives of the community.

 Yesterday's case began in 1996, when Timothy Ring was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting to death John Magoch, an armored car driver.

 There were two accomplices in the robbery that led to Magoch's murder, but neither testified at Ring's jury trial. At the sentencing hearing, one accomplice testified that Ring was the "leader" and had taken joy in killing Magoch. Based largely on this testimony, the judge determined that Ring should be executed.

 There are about 3,700 convicted murderers on death rows around the country. In 29 of the 38 death penalty states, the jury determines the defendant's fate.

June 25, 2002

Court ruling to save death row inmates

From Katty Kay in Washington

AS MANY as a fifth of America�s death row inmates could have their sentences overturned after the US Supreme Court ruled that juries and not judges must decide if a criminal gets the death sentence.

The 7-2 decision was the Court�s second major ruling to tighten the implementation of the death penalty in less than a week and overturns another recent Supreme Court ruling on the issue.

 The ruling was welcomed by opponents of the death penalty, who described it as �very decisive�.

 Brenda Bowser of the Death Penalty Information Centre, said: �It says a lot that the Supreme Court today has expressed extreme reservations about the way the death penalty is being applied.�

 The 7-2 ruling immediately overturns the death sentences of 150 convicts and could also affect the sentences of 800 death row inmates in US states where the decision to impose the death penalty is left to judges alone.

 The Supreme Court ruled that a death sentence imposed by a judge was unconstitutional because it deprived a defendant of his right to a trial by his peers. �

 We hold that the Sixth Amendment secures to capital defendants, no less than to non-capital defendants, the right to a jury determination,� Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the decision, which brought an unusual court alliance of conservatives and liberals.

 The two Supreme Court justices who opposed the jury decision said that it would have a �severely destabilising effect on our criminal justice system,� because so many questions remained unanswered and because so many would challenge their sentences.

 The court�s decision, coming so soon after the decision last week to ban the death penalty for the mentally retarded, suggests that America�s highest legal authority is taking a serious look at how the death penalty is applied.

 The decision was unusual because it reversed a 1990 Supreme Court ruling that judges were allowed sole responsibility in imposing the death sentence.

 Nationwide about 3,700 people are on death row in the 38 US states which allow the death penalty. The penalty is decided by judges in nine states and by juries in the remaining 29. The nine states will now have to change the way they impose capital punishment.

 The Supreme Court�s decision was based on the case of a Timothy Ring, who was sentenced to death for the 1994 killing of an armoured car driver. The judge in Mr Ring�s case decided on the death penalty after the jury had already been dismissed.

 ï¿½I was essentially given two trial,� Ring said. �One before a jury and then one before a judge.�

 The ruling will have an immediate impact in the states of Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and Nebraska, where a single judge or a panel of judges alone decide the death penalty.

 It was not immediately clear what would happen to the 168 death row inmates in those states. The ruling is retroactive and lawyers suggested those inmates could have their death sentences commuted to life in prison.

 The ruling will also affect the fate of inmates in four other states, Florida, Alabama, Indiana and Delaware, where judges decide on the death sentence after consulting juries.

 It was not clear what the outcome would be in those four states, but the 629 inmates on death row in them were expected to challenge their sentences