Last year when the tsunami struck the Indian Ocean littoral states of South and South East Asia a day after Christmas, it was perceived to be an �act of God�. The two defining characteristics of act of God are: lack of predictability and lack of control. As an act of God, it means that there is no structure of liability that can be drawn into dealing with the damages and losses incurred by those affected by the tsunami; and that instead of entitlements an element of �largess� and ex-gratia doles dominates the discourse on relief and rehabilitation of the tsunami victims.

In the immediate aftermath of tsunami, a traumatized world mobilized resources like never before. Enormous quantities of food, drinking water, medicines and clothing reached the disaster areas by every available means of transport within a very short period. It prevented what could have been a much larger human catastrophe. The emotional and financially generous reaction of the world was a tribute to a collective sense of human solidarity. Responses embodied unprecedented humanitarian spirit in the disaster relief mission. Reports from the scene of disaster testified to countless examples of local goodness. In face of very heavy odds, starvation and epidemics were prevented. Nevertheless, it is in the recovery phase that so much can go wrong and where so much needs to be achieved.

The great need of the recovery phase is to recreate lost communities and support their networks. True, the tsunami ravaged coastal areas of Indian Ocean continue to be assisted in resettlement and rehabilitation operations by national and local governments, international agencies, NGOs and INGOs, other civil society groups and individuals in varying degrees and modes. Not always the commitments made in the initial flush of sympathy are honoured in their entirety. Tsunami recovery experience is no different. Logistic difficulties, local ethnic divisions, inter-state rivalries, diplomatic suspicions, donor�s own problems are the reasons advanced by the major donors shying away from their earlier promises. This is not to belittle sheer magnitude of emergency relief. Its greatest achievement was instaneous recognition of the pre-eminent value of human being. But since then relatively much less attention has been given to tackle emerging complex challenges. What we now have in the name of recovery is a mix of rations, some public works, means-tested benefits including micro finances and subsidies to the most vulnerable among the affected people and several training schemes. These are indeed laudable measures but cannot or should not be the mainstay of recreating communities and communities of local networks and livelihoods. In essence, an environment of basic socio-economic security has to be created and reciprocities have to be regenerated within viable emerging communities.

It goes straight to the attitudinal issue�the relationship between the affected people and the agencies and the people who have helped and are helping them. This time the big players�national disaster relief apparatus, multilateral agencies, development banks, and large NGOs and INGOs have adopted the usual tool kit approach that has often been found wanting. The tool-kit approach has presumed that tsunami disaster, being essentially the same as other disasters though on a much larger scale, could be fixed with tried and tested technical approach. Need assessment disarticulated from local realities has added to the democratic deficit which some tsunami hit areas have faced due to ongoing ethnic conflicts and freedom/autonomy movements in worst-hit areas of north and north-east Sri Lanka and Banda Aceh island in Indonesia. The upshot of all this are slippages in coordination, widespread allegations of pilferage of relief materials, bureaucratic bungling and legal obtuseness, and underpayment of grants to victims.

Ethnic conflicts and freedom/autonomy movements in the tsunami-hit areas pose one of the major challenges to the reconstruction efforts. Third countries and international agencies have encountered serious challenges from internal warring communities in undertaking rebuilding programmes: who is the �legitimate� authority in a disturbed/disputed territory; who represent the people there; who should the aid givers work with; who owns and shares responsibility for dispersal of relief material among the victims; is the material fairly distributed among the needy. Sri Lanka and Indonesia, the two worst hit nations by tsunami and also by secessionist conflicts, pose many such problems to aid agencies and rehabilitation personnel.

Leaving politics aside, ignoring significant contextual constraints has exposed many flaws in relief and rehabilitation measures across tsunami-hit states. Without exception, fishing and island communities have been most adversely affected. They suffered huge losses of life, of houses, of tools and implements of their livelihoods. These proud communities have largely sustained their livelihoods without much attention of national planners and policy makers. By and large, they can be classed as living in conditions of poverty and insecurity. Also, by and large, with immense trust in their faith traditions, they have learnt to cope with vagaries, risks and shocks that nature occasionally imposes on them. Traditionally aid agencies and volunteers come to their physical rescue in an emergency and then depart, but their deeply held faith and its outreach mechanisms provide them with solace and warmth on an ongoing basis.

A striking feature of post tsunami disaster response has been the treatment of the �crisis� as opportunities that are normally difficult to create. It could be seen as opportunity to reconstruct lives of affected so that it improves upon what existed when disaster struck. It could be an opportunity to advance an agenda that perhaps predates disaster. In India, for instance, the state is trying to implement a statutory provision to evict any body living within 200 meters of high tide level or not to allow residential constructions�a provision that has existed on paper since 1991 but had remained unimplemented. There is rising suspicion that areas thus vacated will be eventually handed over to private interests�building modern fishing harbours for deep-sea trawlers, tourism and allied activities. How this opportunity plays itself out remains to be seen.

The tsunami has also meant opportunity for large NGOs. Take the case of Tamil Nadu in India. The state has invited only those NGOs to build dwelling units and appropriate infrastructure on free land who have clear intent to put at least Rs. 7.5 million and above for such construction. In effect, smaller NGOs have been kept out and larger NGOs have started acting as civil contractors. Not only has it privileged rich NGOs over those that are community based and hands on, it has also brought into being a contractual relationship between the state and the NGOs, leaving affected communities out of the recovery discourse.

Increasingly, a fair amount of humanitarian, reconstruction and development funding is spent on security and welfare of agency personnel, administrative charges and public relations exercise in national and international media. To an extent, all this may be necessary to elicit funds and to find ways for better implementation of plans to meet emerging expectations. However, this also provides ammunition to xenophobic anti-INGO discourse that circulates among various nationalist groups in the region embroiled in domestic conflicts. They accuse the donors of political and/or sectarian favouritism, lopsided prioritization, and undervaluing of local knowledge and networks. The INGOs also compete among themselves to advertise their work, secure contracts and control of particular sectors and projects. This competition sets up its own dynamics, the most obvious being exclusion of local priorities and alternative approaches to development that depart from neo-liberal orthodoxy.

While human goodness has prevailed over selfishness (which is often reframed as legitimate human right), reconstruction efforts have not been entirely free from political tensions. Unlike India and Thailand, who said that they could cope on their own, Indonesia accepted foreign troops to deal with tsunami devastation. Within Indonesia it led to outpouring of opinion that saw in it a surrender of sovereignty, but the US saw in it an opportunity to reap �great dividends� in world�s largest Islamic state. Europe opposed centralized relief mechanism put in place by the US and prevailed in favour of UN-centered relief mechanism. China question Japan�s motives.