30/05/1998

Community of St. Egidio in Kosovo

On September 1, 1996 the Educational Agreement for Kosovo was signed by President Slobodan Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia and by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the Albanian leader in Kosovo, the Serbian province with a population that is 90 percent Albanian. The agreement anticipated that the Albanian youth of Kosovo, who had not been in school for five years, would return to school. It calls for the �normalization� of the school system there and the establishment of an implementation commission of three representatives from the government and three from the Albanian community.

This was the first official agreement of any kind reached between the Serb government and the Albanian community in this century. Beyond the specific terms of the agreement, it also made a contribution toward general political accommodation, or at least it seemed to do so at the time it was signed. A variety of delays and difficulties have been encountered in the effort to implement the agreement, till the protocol of implementation was signed on March 23, 1998, after which the Albanians began to re-enter the public schools and universities.

St. Egidio facilitated the convening of the parties, as well as being a member of the commission formed to implement the agreement. The agreement expresses appreciation to St. Egidio for its contribution to the dialogue that generated it.

Since the early part of this decade, as the situation in the Balkans deteriorated, the Community of St. Egidio worked to multiply its contacts in the former Yugoslavia to promote dialogue and peace. The Community�s effort had two goals�to facilitate dialogue among the religious communities engaged in the Yugoslavian war, that is, among Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim leaders; and to work on a settlement of the conflict in Kosovo.

The first formal effort was made in 1993 through contacts in both Albania and the former Yugoslavia. Various proposals were offered, but they were not accepted by the two parties. Representatives of St. Egidio held meetings with, among others, Milosevic, Rugova, and Albanian president Sali Berisha. The discussions confirmed the large gap between the Serbian and Albanian positions regarding Kosovo. In 1992 the Albanians in Kosovo had voted in a referendum for independence. The Serb leadership was not prepared to grant legitimacy to the effort to discuss Albanian rights. Daily the gulf between the two million Albanians and the 200,000 Serbs resident in Kosovo widened.

The Albanians began to develop alternative institutions for administration, schools, hospitals, health center, and small businesses. From 1993 to 1997 there were in effect two societies in Kosovo, each ignoring the other, except for the repressive activities of the Serbian police. The Albanians opted out of the existing structures and have been living in a virtually stateless condition, with dramatic consequences for their social, economic, and cultural life. The Serb population, which regards Kosovan independence as non-negotiable, lying as it does at the heart of Serb culture and history, tries to avoid contact with Albanians. The Serbs in the remainder of Serbia are fully supportive of the Kosovo Serbs and consider them a line of resistance against the Islamic, primitive, and irresponsibly prolific Albanians.

During 1994 and 1995, St. Egidio�s contacts with both sides showed no signs of flexibility on either. The Albanians would consider nothing short of independence. For their part, the Serbs denied that there was an ethnic problem in Kosovo; the problem was that the Albanians refused to be Serbian citizens. Despite this inflexibility, St. Egidio was able to sustain its dialogue with both sides. In addition, representatives from St. Egidio made periodic visits to Belgrade and Pristina. St. Egidio invited Albanian leaders to visit St. Egidio headquarters in Rome, and St. Egidio provided humanitarian aid (primarily medical assistance) to both Serb and Albanian populations.

In June 1995 St. Egidio detected slightly greater flexibility on both sides. The Serb leadership in Belgrade seemed to be ready to engage in a dialogue with Albanians. But it was not clear who would be prepared to engage in dialogue. Because of its good contacts and reputation for goodwill and impartiality, the Serbs accepted St. Egidio�s offer of facilitation, after having rejected several other offers of international mediation, which they feared would undermine the Serb position that the Kosovo question constitutes an internal problem for the Republic of Serbia. The Serbs concluded that St. Egidio could facilitate dialogue on a private, humanitarian, and unofficial basis. For their part, the Albanians accepted St. Egidio as being fully independent of the Serbian state. Moreover, St. Egidio�s involvement implied the internationalization of the Kosovo question. The direct dialogue did not commence until summer 1996, after months of negotiation between the parties.

An essential precondition to the initiation of this dialogue was the renunciation by the Albanian representatives of discussing independence. It was agreed, however, that involvement in the dialogue would not prejudice the longer-term goal of independence. St. Egidio proposed that the dialogue begin by focusing on concrete issues relating to schooling, health care, culture, newspapers, sports, police activity, and the like. Larger political and institutional questions could be considered later. The willingness of the Serb representatives to engage in this discussion implied the recognition, for the first time, of the Albanian population as a distinct community.

The implementation of the agreement proved very difficult. Several factors have contributed to this, including debate on the legitimacy of international mediation provided by St. Egidio on what the Serbs perceive to be a domestic issue; the increase in Serb nationalism and the heightening of political and military tension in the region; and the strengthening of the armed opposition and increasing militancy among the Kossovars of Albanian descent.

Immediately following the signing of the education agreement, the Serbs objected to St. Egidio�s being given the chairmanship of the �3+3� commission. After two months, Milosevic realized that he had no alternative and St. Egidio was accepted in this position. But then the Albanians hardened their position, contending that the university situation had to be settled before the high school. The Albanians object to the Serbian insistence that they integrate themselves into a Yugoslavian educational structure, while the Serbs insist that the Albanians recognize their citizenship and behave accordingly. Despite these obstacles, the 3+3 commission under St. Egidio chairmanship offers a channel for ongoing dialogue and negotiation which will continue to address these divisive issues.

Factors Contributing to St. Egidio�s Effectiveness

St. Egidio�s motivation for engagement is central to its effectiveness. The members of the Community of St. Egidio have a strong sense of responsibility to those in pain and suffering, especially the poor. The Community also has a profound appreciation for its own weakness. The caring attitude that St. Egidio exhibits towards the less fortunate around the world opens the opportunity for person-to-person contact. Beyond the commitment to personal relationships with those in need lies the strong conviction that peace comes through dialogue and understanding.

As a Christian foundation, St. Egidio believes that peacemaking is an essential part of its mission, requiring of it patience and commitment to long-term engagement. The work of the Community is sustained by the belief that it has nothing to lose from failure. At the same time, the Community painfully acknowledges that failure will make people who are already suffering even more vulnerable, and the most vulnerable of those are women and children, who suffer disproportionately from wars and conflict. St. Egidio positions itself at a moral distance from those in positions of privilege who often reap political advantage from the continuation of war.

St. Egidio�s goals also benefit from its ability to amass and manage information about conflict situations from a wide range of sources, including an extensive network of diplomats, political figures, and other professionals from Italy and other countries. St. Egidio maintains direct, personal relationships with key actors. In addition, beyond being a nongovernmental organization, St. Egidio has no bureaucracy and is not burdened by red tape, which increases its efficiency. St. Egidio has a modest but sufficient level of human and financial resources to initiate action, and the fundraising capacity to sustain involvement. Finally, the location of the St. Egidio headquarters in a small but beautifully restored and functional convent in Rome constitutes an invaluable resource as a setting for dialogues and meetings.

The changing international political context has also contributed to St. Egidio�s success. The end of the Cold War, the evolution of new dimensions to old conflicts (for example in Mozambique and Guatemala), and the emergence of new intrastate conflicts all call for new and creative forms of peacemaking. St. Egidio has discovered a growing receptiveness in the U.S. diplomatic community to new tools and modes of peacemaking, including those offered by St. Egidio. There is a greater awareness of the need for new nonstate actors on the international scene, as well as a new appreciation of the indispensability of the structures of civil society in sustaining peace. The United Nations plays new roles that change the diplomatic landscape. There is also less hesitance to allow religiously-motivated organizations to engage in peacemaking. St. Egidio also benefits from the new roles open to medium-sized countries, like Italy, in international affairs. The growing popularity of Track II diplomacy and of conflict resolution reinforces the potential utility of St. Egidio�s approach. St. Egidio also understands and productively exploits the link between humanitarian assistance and political processes.

St. Egidio believes that because every conflict situation is unique, new approaches must be adopted for each new intervention. Nevertheless, it has found elements common to all effective peacemaking:

- the readiness of all the parties to be in contact with each other;

- the identification of credible facilitators or mediators;

- a flexible approach in the dialogue and negotiating sessions;

- the maintenance of relationships and communication channels with all the key actors in the international community;

- the preservation of discretion and confidentiality; and

- the acquisition of adequate resources to sustain involvement, including language skills, a supportive logistical environment, financial resources, and communication capabilities to enable each delegation to remain in regular contact with its leaders.

Roberto Morozzo della Rocca